CHAPTER SIX

                               Nationalism.
Defining the term.
     Nationalism is a broad term, which, especially in recent
years, has acquired various connotations. Confining ourselves to
some of the more recent literature on the subject, we note that the
term may refer to:
1. a sentiment usually called "patriotism" and generally expressing
a high evaluation of one's nation ;
2. extreme cases of this sentiment leading to aggressiveness and to
devaluation of other nations ;
3. a feeling of solidarity based on a common culture, regardless of
political boundaries

                               CHAPTER SEVEN

Organization and conflict
Introductory remarks.
A few important principles of organization have been set aside
for a separate discussion in previous chapters. This does not imply
that they operate in sharply defined fields. It seems useful to
think of pela, religion, nationalism, etc. as potentialities, which
are not translated into action until called upon by individual
initiative. As such these principles are available for the sake of
individual or group interests. Activities involved, as has been
generally observed, usually serve more aims than only the
ostensible one. A knowledge of the various interests existing among
the members of a group, seems of primary importance.
Existing divisions of the refugees, based on territorial
principles, on religious affiliation and on adherence to political
factions, indicate not only different spheres of interests, but
also diverging interests in the same field, as for example, in the
field of nationalism. Other factors, such as sex and age, may exert
influence. Status influences, based on education and former
military rank, should also be accounted for. There is a minority of
ex-soldiers, born and raised in Java or Sumatra, for whom
territorial ties usually have less meaning. There are a few
"burghers" among the refugees, and also a sprinkling of Javanese,
Timorese and Macassarese. Ties established in former military units
are not necessarily dissolved after discharge from the army. All
these factors may be assumed to represent specific interests. They
may assist in the creation of new principles of organization and
give rise to separate associations or to the formation of cliques.
It is also possible that they remain more covert factors active
within the domain of more comprehensive organizations.
In using the principles of organization as potentialities, it
is possible to bring out the dynamic character of a situation by
not merely describing groups and their activities, but by tracing
each principle as it is applied in changing circumstances. The
village of origin, for example, is an idea, a fiction, if you like,
in the present situation. Yet, in spite of the fact that the
members formally belonging to such a group are scattered over
several camps, it has remained an important principle of
organization. The question why this principle is used, seems less
important here than the question:"What is it used for? When is it
applied, and by whom?"

(Devin note: Here I have removed a short, seemingly irrelevant paragraph which seemed to be about skin color, and inserted a section that seemed to fit more logically from another version of the same manuscript)

Common origin has a general relevance as a factor in drawing
people together for action, when they find themselves in a foreign
environment. Its sociological significance lies in its capacity to
serve various aims.
The possibility of differential application suggests an
interrelatedness with other principles of organization and their
concurrence in social action.
Let me illustrate this with an example. The election of an
camp-council is a community affair. The members of the council 
represent the camp-population, regardless of village or island of
origin, pela or religious affiliation. At an election it is
emphasized that the individual is free to vote for any candidate he
personally prefers. An election is said to be
"sukarela"(voluntary). The actual voting is secret, but to become
a candidate, a man has to produce a list signed by 25 supporters.
Who are these supporters?
An investigation revealed that one such list was made up
exclusively of fellow-villagers and islanders. Another candidate
had among his supporters a number of former members of his military
unit, and the Muslim candidate was supported by the Muslim minority
in the camp. In yet another case, a candidate owed his nomination
to the support of a large number of students, concentrated in his
camp.
The event of an election as an organizational activity on the
community principle reveals already at a first rough analysis, the
application of four other principles of organization in this field.
A common village or island of origin, friendship established during
military life, religious affiliation, and common intellectual
interest (or status), have been brought into play to further aims,
which although ostensibly in the interest of the whole community,
essentially represent the various group and individual interests
common to any human aggregate.
Each candidate makes a choice as to which potentiality for
concerted action will serve him best in this specific situation.
The fact that, for example, village-membership may be an active
principle also beyond the field of typical village group-
activities, shows that group membership implies more than the mere
participation in such activities. Enduring relations between the
individual members have been established, or are assumed.

(Devin note: end section included from another version of the same manuscript.)

In our case, the relevant political and social factors are not
implicit in the immediate social situation, but refer to the
background of the refugees in post-colonial Indonesia. The
attitudes are therefore not reciprocated in a manner corresponding
with the character of the situation in which they arose.
The majority of the Dutch public is indifferent with regard to
the Ambonese problem, and Indonesia is too remote to be considered
an active factor in the situation.
The foreign setting in which the further development of the
attitudes is taking place gives the process a specific character.
In spite of a comparative isolation of the process in a foreign
environment, a keen sense of actuality is evident in the behaviour
of the refugees.
It should be noted that the following illustrations refer to
a stage in the process when changes had already taken place,
especially in the attitude towards Holland. These changes can be
related to the following events:
First, the invasion of Ambon, and second the discharge of the
soldiers upon their arrival in Holland.
When Ambon was invaded, a hope that Holland would come to the
rescue was crushed by persistent rumours that Dutch transport ships
and bombers had assisted the Indonesian invasion forces.
This has aroused an indignation, which still has not subsided among
the refugees.
The second event was perhaps even more devastating. Their
discharge from the military service upon arrival in Holland, hit
the Ambonese economically and socially. Wages stopped and were
substituted by pocket money. Achieved ranks were no longer valid.
All this has led to strong protests. Numerous propaganda
pamphlets and public speeches expressed strong indignation and a
firm belief in ultimate justice. A pamphlet published in 1953 says:
"We are aware that it is difficult to keep up the struggle against
the Republic of Indonesia, which has been assisted by The
Netherlands. Is it impossible? No! In the eyes of man, we have a
poor chance. Fortunately however, it is not man, who writes the
history of peoples. Neither the Dutch nor the Indonesians. We shall
inspire our people to continue the struggle, not expecting justic
from the Dutch government, but only from God.

Resentment against the Dutch government is openly expressed,
but a distinction is often made between the government and the
people of Holland:"Free South-Moluccans, men and women, Christians
and Muslims, make an appeal to the Dutch people, because the Dutch
government was not prepared to do justice to them. People of
Holland, do not stifle your conscience!:
The last sentence appeared in a slogan on one of the banners
during a demonstration in the Hague on 24th of April 1953.
In other cases no distinction is made between government and
people. At a visit to the office of the central council of the
internal organization  in the Hague, one of the members said, by
way of introduction:"Before I answer any of your questions, I want
to tell you that I shall never in my life trust a Dutchman again,
and I shall pass on this warning to my children and grandchildren."
"Holland has done a great wrong to Ambon,"said an old man in
one of the camps I visited,"but we can leave it in the hands of
Allah. Surely a terrible punishment is in store for the people of
Holland".
It seems clear that Holland is held responsible for many
failures, and that it is considered the duty of the Dutch people to
promote the Ambonese cause.
With regard to Indonesia, the rejection of Indonesian
citizenship is first of all emphasized. They consider Indonesians
to be their enemy. Official and unofficial references to the
refugees as Indonesians have met with vehement protests.
On the 9th December 1952, the central council sent an address
to the Dutch "Staten-Generaal" (First and Second Chamber of
Representatives), from which I quote the following:"We have never
been citizens of the Republic of Indonesia and never shall we
consider ourselves as such. Therefore we shall never accept the
"protection" of the Republic of Indonesia, with which the Republic
of the South-Moluccas is officially at war, no matter whether
Holland, out of economic considerations, would recognize the
Republic of the South-Moluccas or not....We shall keep maintaining
the standpoint that we are citizens of a sovereign Republik Maluku
Selatan...Owing to our South-Moluccan citizenship, we consider
ourselves to be subjects of a state hostile to the Republic of
Indonesia".
Not only in official statements does the anti-Indonesian
attitude become apparent. Earlier on I have noted that an Ambonese
visitor to one of the camps in Java before the evacuation, was
killed as a traitor, when he tried to persuade the soldiers to
relinquish the nationalistic cause and join the Indonesians. Even
the appointed representative of the R.M.S. in Holland was attacked
by a mob in one of the camps when he was suspected of pro-
Indonesian leanings Political factions (see below) may use such
accusations against each other. Not expressed openly-this would
invite direct assault-the accusations take the form of innuendos in
private conversations among fellow faction members.
Our evidence regarding attitudes indicates clearly, that a
moral standpoint is taken by the refugees. Holland has done a great
wrong, and to accuse a man of siding with Indonesia deserves
punishment by God. The strong emotional quality of their behaviour
shows the close connection with what is considerd by the refugees
themselves the main issue: the idea of national independence.The
attitude towards Indonesia is expressed mainly in terms of Dutch
shortcomings with regard to this cause. In the expression of the
attitudes, their own position is defined and confirmed.
System of ideas behind the attitudes.
Some of these ideas have already become evident in previous
illustrations. But the Ambonese feel themselves not only wronged as
a group of ex-soldiers. They represent the people of the R.M.S.,
who are still defending their rights against enormous odds. This is
expressed in one of the pamphlets as follows:"With the utmost
determination we shall keep refusing to return to the Republic of
Indonesia, which owes its existence to the violation of treaties,
because on no condition do we want to betray those who died in the
struggle against foreign invaders and those who at present still
continue the fight against Indonesian aggression.
This spear-head idea is also evident in the attitude of some
people towards festivities. At a wedding-feast, the host said:" Of
course, this is not a real feast. It would not be proper to
organiza big feasts in these times". In the camp Almere, the
chairman of the camp-council would not allow dancing, because"this
is not a time for dancing and parties". Another Ambonese told me,
that he had visited his sister, who lived in the Hague. It sounded
like an apology when he added:"I decided to go just for once,
because it was her birthday".
Related also to the spear-head idea is a referring to the
whole group as "free South-Moluccans", in contrast to their people
at home, who are dominated by the Indonesians. A teacher compared
his group with the free Poles in Great-Britain, and in telegrams
sent to the United Nations in November 1953, there is a reference
to"all free South-Moluccans in exile".
The idea of a people in exile is a favourite theme in the
Sunday sermons. Like the Jews of the Old Testament, the refugees
are waiting for their return to the promised land. Like the faith
of the children of Israel made the wall of Jericho crumble, thus
their faith will overcome all difficulties at present confronting
them. The notion of being exiled is attended by a general attitude
towards the present as a "djaman sengsara"(period of tribulation,
hardship).
In the negative sense, ideas about the future are expressed in
terms of a rejection of Indonesian domination."Never under
Sukarno"; "Rather dead than under Sukarno" are common phrases
indicated strong emotional feelings underlying the anti-Indonesian
attitude.
Symbols.
Consequent to the desire to be recognized as citizens of the
Republic of the South-Moluccas, a number of national symbols after
the Western model have come into use to emphasize the distinctness
of the group from Indonesia and other nations. Symbols, necessary
to be recognized as a modern nation, such as :name, constitution,
flag, national anthem.
The name: "Republik Maluku Selatan", usually abbreviated to
R.M.S., denotes the nation that came into being by the
proclamation. The territory is marked out on the map of Indonesia.
Its boundaries include, besides the Spice islands and Ceram, the
more southern island group of Aru, Kai, Tanimbar, Babar, and Wetar.
The map of the territory, with the name printed across, heads the
front-page of a monthly issued by the "Perwakilan Umum Pemerintah
Republik Maluku Selatan Luar Negeri"(General Representative of the
South Moluccan Government Abroad).
The four-coloured flag (blue-white-green-red) is an essential
prerequisite of nationalistic ceremonies. On the 25th of each
month, the inmates of the camps gathr around their flagpole to
attend the hoisting of the flag as part of a regular ceremony to
commemorate the proclamation of independence on the 25th of April
1950, Badges bearing the national colours are generally worn by
Dutch sympathizers as well as by the Ambonese themselves.
A flag, once adopted, seems soon to acquire emotional value,
even in the case of an unofficial newly-created republic like the
R.M.S. Dutch officials came to realize this when, in July 1951, a
few months after the arrival of the Ambonese in Holland, they came
to the camp in Woerden with government orders to take down the Dutch-
and R.M.S. flags. The camp-council refused to obey the orders, and
a crowd soon gathered around the officials. When the Dutch camp-
manager started to haul both flags down, he was attacked by the
crowd, and the R.M.S. flag was immediately hoisted again. The
retreating officials threatened to send in military forces, which
evoked a loud:"We won't give way even for tanks".
The incident called forth a lot of criticism  against the
action of the government. The "Maasbode" of 31th July '51, a
Catholic paper, expressed serious doubts with regard to the
competence of the Minister of Home Affairs, and "Trouw", a
Calvinist paper, considered the view of the government in this
matter "inadmissible".
Another illustration of what is considered to be a proper
attitude towards the flag, is embodied in a photograph of the flag
flying from a pole in one of the camps, while a number of Ambonese
in military uniform salute the flag. Below is the motto:"We honour
you, o flag. Symbol of our freedom! In our hearts you are safe".
Further down it says:" The national four-colour flag of the
South Moluccas, hoisted from the government office at Batugadjah,
Ambon for the first time on 25th March, 1950, flies proudly in the
Dutch skies also, hoisted there by loyal R.M.S.-subjects".
The national anthem,"Hena Masa Waja" is less prominent than
the flag, as a national symbol. Apart from its apparent emotional
appeal to the refugees, it lacks the convenient directness of flag
and name as means to testify to the proclaimed independence. Its
language is unintelligible to most Ambonese themselves. My
informants could not give a translation, and an elderly man from
Ceram had to be found, who could offer only a fragmentary Malay
version. When sung by a crowd, it sounds like a dirge, differing
widely from th tunes of "Ambonese" guitar-music, which is generally
appreciated in Holland.
The actual use of the national anthem is, more than in the
case of the flag, for internal purposes, because it is less easily
distinguishable as a symbol of nationality by outsiders. At
nationalistic ceremonies, such as the prayer-meeting on the eve of
the 25th of each month, and the hoisting of the flag on the next
morning, the national anthem is sung by the audience while the
flute orchestra plays the tune. It combination with the flute
orchestra is significant with regard to what is considered a proper
attitude towards the national anthem. The numerous guitar-bands (in
big camps two or three) are not employed to play the "Hena Masa
Waja". Their music is exclusively for entertainment and propaganda.
The flute orchestra, on the other hand, is associated with the
church and with solemn music. It should not be used for ordinary
entertainment. On one occasion protests were raised for this
reason, when the members of the orchestra went out on a weekday to
play for a Dutch audience.
The singing of the anthem in the church as part of the prayer-
meeting ritual is also an indication that it is considered proper
to bring it within the religious sphere.
As for the literal meaning of the text, people are in doubt.
There is however an interpretation which seems important with
regard to the situation of the refugees. I showed the Malay version
to an Ambonese teacher, the son of a former Ceram radja.
He shrugged:"I don't think anybody knows the precise meaning of the
words", he said,"we know that" Hena Masa Waja", the first line,
stands for: "This is a song of the old days". It is essentially a
song of lamentation. It tells the story of a man who gets into
serious trouble during a journey. He had been left in the lurch by
his pela. Of course, this is not all literally in the song. It is
the allusions that are important, for example:"There is the home of
the radja. There is Sepa", and so on, implying that he has been
deserted by everyone".
This interpretation seems to allow of analogies with present
circumstances. The theme of being deserted and without allies might
well account for the appeal the song apparently has among  the
refugees. On the hectographed copies of the song, issued to the
soldiers while they were still in Djakarta, it was designated
as:"Biduan Masohi" (Djakarta 28th October, 1950. Its introduction
in the period during the invasion of Ambon is likely to have
promoted its association with nationalistic sentiments. The name
:Biduan Masohi" appeals to the people. The first word is Malay for
"singer". The second word is of indigenous Moluccan origin. It
stands for the conception of mutual help. The "masohi singer" then
could be interpreted as a message about the sad situation in the
home islands, implying the urgent need for help and cooperation.
A last important symbol to be mentioned in this field, is a
slogan, which has come into general use among the refugees. A
speaker at a political meeting invariably ends his speech with a
loud:"mena!", whereupon the audience shouts back in
chorus:"muria!" Letters often start with "mena", and end with
"muria", and exclamation points are usually added to indicate a
forceful utterance, A combination of the two words is also in use.
The political monthly, issued by the above mentioned "Perwakilan
Umum" is called "Mena Muria". In articles of a provocative nature,
the slogan may be employed as a closing word, or to indicate
determination to carry on the struggle for independence.
The following quotations from articles and reports published
in the monthly:"Mena Muria", illustrate some uses of the slogan in
printing.
-----Republik Maluku Selatan akan bangun dan hidup selama-
lamanja.....Kebenaran harus menang! Mena Muria! (The Republic of
the South-Moluccas shall rise and live forever.....The truth shall
win...Mena Muria!)-----
-----Kiranja Tuhan Bapa Keadilan hendak menjokong usaha-usaha wakil
kita akan terus berteriak:Sekali proklamasi tetap Mena Muria untuk
R.M.S.!(May the Lord,father of justice,sustain the efforts of our
representative in America...so that we can call out with full
determinationa;Once the proclamation, forever Mena Muria for the
R.M.S.)-----
-----Menurut kabar jang diperoleh dari Makassar maka Paduka jang
Mulia Dalam Negeri D. Gaspers, jang ditahan beberapa waktu di
Makassar, telah dihentar ke Djakarta. Oom Daan tetap berdarah dan
berpendirian R.M.S. biarpun antjaman Nippon dulu dan sekarang R.I.
Kita jakin Oom Daan tetap bersemangat :"Mena Muria"(According to a
communication received from Makassar, His Excellency, the Home
Minister (of the R.M.S.), D.Gaspers, who has been in prison for
some time in Makassar, has been taken to Djakarta.(Uncle Daan has
always been a worthy son of the R.M.S. in the face of Japanese
intimidations in the past, and those of the R.I.(Republic of
Indonesia) at present. We are convinced that uncle Daan will always
show the Mena Muria spirit)-----
Organizational Aspects.
Collective action of the total group of refugees is achieved
however only in exceptional cases. The group is split up into two
antagonistic factions. One called the B.P.R.M.S. , represents
roughly two thirds of the refugee population. The other faction,
rather more radical in its views, bears the name of a former union
of Ambonese service-men, the C.R.A.M.S.  Both organizations are
headed by a central council elected by male voters over 18. Camps
constitute faction-branches and camp-councils are responsible to
the central council. The general pattern is that camp-committees
side as one body with either the B.P.R.M.S. or the C.R.A.M.S.. Thre
are a few exceptions. One of the large camps, for example, is
divided into two sections, each with a separate camp council. Dutch
government policy is one of the factors accounting for the neatness
of the general pattern. In view of strong antagonism between the
factions, some dissident minorities have been transferred to camps
with a more like-minded population.
The issue dividing the factions is not clear-cut. Members of
both factions express themselves as staunch nationalists.
Statements regarding differences frequently centre around questions
of loyalty:"The B.P.R.M.S. makes common cause with the Dutch"; "The
C.R.A.M.S. would stoop to negotiations with Indonesia"; "The
B.P.R.M.S. has tried secretly to approach Sukarno about a return to
Ambon";"The C.R.A.M.S. is a stupid lot, led by a scoundrel who
takes his pleasure at their expense". One statement took the form
of a more coherent argument. A prominent C.R.A.M.S.member stated
that his faction was active primarily as a continuation of the
former soldiers-union."We have been cheated by the Dutch
government. We did not ask to be sent to the Netherlands. We were
orderd to go. At arrival we were discharged. That was illegal.
Rightfully we are still soldiers, and cannot be discharged until we
arrive in Ambon. When we came here, others interfered, people who
have nothing to do with the soldiers. High-ranking officers,
doctors, and such fellows. They have called themselves
representatives. But we were not the people of Ambon, primarily,
but a group of K.N.I.L.-soldiers , fighting for their rights. This
matter has to be dealt with first. Naturally we also want a free
Ambon. There is no doubt about that. That is the reason why we are
in Holland in the first place, because we refused to return to
Ambon occupied by the Indonesians. But our right is our right, and
is what we stand on".
One of the points mentioned is "interference" by "people who
have nothing to do with soldiers". Most of the people referred to
are Dutch citizens of Ambonese descent, who exercized their right
to repatriation before the transfer of sovereignty. They came to
the front after the Ambonese proclamation of independence as
advocates of the legal rights of the newly created R.M.S. One of
them was appointed "plenipotentiary representative", a few days
after the proclamation. Their educational level is generally higher
than that of the refugees. There are two doctors, a former colonial
officer, and a number of teachers among them, one of whom is a
former delegate for the federal State of East-Indonesia to the
Round Table Conference in 1949. They do not live in the camps, and
many have found an occupation in Holland. The arrival of the
refugees in Holland was an opportunity to lend more substance to
the claims of independence by enlisting the cooperation of the ex-
soldiers. This, however, met with some difficulties. All shared the
nationalistic feelings, but no agreement on a collective programme
of action could be reached.
At a general meeting held at Utrecht in July '51, an audience
representing the majority of the camps, pledged their support to
Dr. N., the foreign representative of the R.M.S. On 15th August
'51, during a visit to a camp, which officially was on his side, he
and another committee member were attacked by a mob. The rumour had
been spread that he was unreliable. People afterwards apologized.
There was a atmosphere of confusion and mutual suspicion, not the
least enhanced by a struggle for precedence in the committee
itself. In the summer of 1951, two so-called         "Bureaux of
the Aouth-Moluccas" were established, both competing for the
support of the refugees. Twice, efforts to establish an over-all
organization failed. At present, each of the two factions,
although headed each by its own central council, has, in addition,
a number of advisers. I use the term adviser for those persons
outside the group of refugees, who have gained a certain amount of
prestige among them. Apart from the appointed representative of the
R.M.S. government, the members of the small external elite have no
official positions. They belong to a loose cluster of outside
supporters, and their activities have an incidental character. As
a group they are not articulated with the main body of refugees.
The general representative has been recognized by the B.P.R.M.S.
The C.R.A.M.S. refuses to do so. The relation between the central
council of the B.P.R.M.S. and the general representative is, by the
former, expressed in an agreed division of activities."We are here
to look after the interests of the camp-population in Holland. Dr.
N. does the foreign affairs. That is his business", I was told at
the office of the B.P.R.M.S. Subordinance of the B.P.R.M.S. to the
general representative was suggested by one of the advisers, who
considers himself the link between the two. For matters concerning
the general representative, the B.P.R.M.S. should approach him
first. He should then discuss things further with the general
representative."It happens indeed that they approach   Dr. N.
directly, but they should in any case give me a ring first". There
are, on the other hand, also indications that the B.P.R.M.S. would
not allow interference with what they consider their own business.
They occupy a separate office, and use their own stamp on letter.
Hand-outs for the camp-population are circulated in their name and
bear their stamp. As a separate body, they approach the Dutch
public in written addresses, and they play a prominent role in
organizing demonstrations. Their position as the representative
body of the majority of the refugees is strengthened by the
attitude of th Dutch government, which,in dealing always directly
with the B.P.R.M.S., ignores the general representative. I have no
evidence that the latter seeks to increase his influence among the
refugees by interfering with the internal organization. He seldom
addresses a meeting. His periodical "Mena Muria" is popular and
generally read. The contents are devoted entirely to the
nationalistic cause and are obviously intended as a stimulant to
carry on the movement. The relation between the central council of
the B.P.R.M.S. and the general representative seems therefore
characterized by a strict division of labour among partners rather
than by different positions in a hierarchical system, in which one
has to await orders from the other.This does not exclude a general
appreciation of his activities for the common cause. By members of
the B.P.R.M.S. faction, he is invariably spo9ken of with respect,
and in publications, he is referred to as "Jang Mulia Wakil R.M.S.
untuk Nederland". Apart from personality factors,     Wakil R.M.S.
untuk Nederland (His Excellency the R.M.S. Representative voor the
Netherlands). Apart from personality factors, his prestige among
the refugees is due to ascribed as well as achieved status. He is
the son of an Ambonese village headman, and his Dutch citizenship-
like becoming a full church-member-implies the achievement of a
rank among his own people rather than a separation from them. These
two factors, topped by the exceptional factor of his university
degree, make him eminently eligible for leadership.
It is obvious, however, that these qualifications alone have
not been sufficient to make him acceptable to the refugees. But
after an initial period, necessary to win their confidence, his
prestige at present seems well established.
The influence of the C.R.A.M.S.-advisers, although their
position is less formal than that of Dr.N., is certainly not less
effective. During the first few months after the arrival of the
refugees, the opinion of the C.R.A.M.S. was voiced by three
advisers, who collectively signed public declarations and
addresses. They did not cooperate with Dr. N., and had established
their own "Bureau of the South Moluccas", implying that they also
represented the proclaimed R.M.S. In August '51, Dr. N., after
having previously secured the support of the majority of the
refugees at the Utrecht meeting in July, declared the second
"Bureau" to be illegal. As the only one among the external elite
who actually has been appointed representative immediately after
the proclamation, he was                         formally in the
position to do so. But although the "Bureau" has since disappeared,
his move did not bring about the expected breakdown of the
C.R.A.M.S. organization. It ended the political career of the
leading adviser who had posed as an R.M.S. representative. But the
second man took his place, had himself elected as a chairman of the
C.R.A.M.S. central council, and succeeded in keeping his flock
together.

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